



Anonymous Russia





| Summary | 3 |
|--|----|
| Cyber Wars in The Ukraine-Russia War | 3 |
| Threat Actor Review: Anonymous Russia | 4 |
| Who is Anonymous Russia? | 4 |
| What are the Activities of Anonymous Russia? | 5 |
| Which Side They Supports? | 5 |
| What Types of Attacks Does Anonymous Russia Execute? | 5 |
| Which Industries Is Anonymous Russia Targeting? | 5 |
| Anonymous Russia's Attacks | 6 |
| 10 July 2022 | 6 |
| 10 July 2022 | 7 |
| 20 July 2022 | 8 |
| 22 July 2022 | 9 |
| 24 July 2022 | 10 |
| 25 July 2022 | 11 |
| 7 August 2022 | 12 |
| 14 August 2022 | 13 |
| 15 August 2022 | 14 |
| 16 September 2022 | 14 |
| 18 November 2022 | 15 |
| 12 February 2023 | 15 |
| 20 February 2023 | 16 |
| 22 March 2023 | 17 |
| 22 March 2023 | 18 |
| 28 March 2023 | 19 |
| 28 March 2023 | 20 |
| Technical-Tactical-Procedures(TTP) | 22 |
| Anonymous Russia's Attack TTPs | 23 |
| Anonymous Russia's Attack IOCs | 24 |



Summary

The beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war dates back to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. The political tension that erupted in 2021-2022 was the last straw and Russian forces took action on Putin's orders. Taking action on February 24, 2022, Russian forces launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that this is not an invasion, but that Russia is protecting its geopolitical interests in the region, its citizens and its deployed soldiers.

This report is the 3rd Report in a series of investigations on threat actors playing an active role in the Ukraine-Russia war, based on the Anonymous Russia report shared by ThreatMon earlier.

Cyber Wars in The Ukraine-Russia War

In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, leading to conflict in the Donbass region and the start of a cyber war between Ukraine and Russia. Since then, Ukraine has been a frequent target of Russian cyber attacks, including ransomware, DDoS, and data manipulation. These attacks have targeted critical sectors such as energy, finance, and communication.

One of the most notable cyber attacks on Ukraine occurred in 2015 when parts of the country experienced power cuts. The attack was allegedly carried out by the pro-Russian group Sandworm, which targeted the country's electricity grid. This cyber attack caused a worldwide debate on cybersecurity and served as a wake-up call for Ukraine to take stronger measures on cybersecurity.

Following the attack, Ukraine implemented several measures to enhance its cybersecurity capabilities. The country established a National Coordination Center for Cybersecurity and developed a national cybersecurity strategy. Additionally, the government introduced legislation to strengthen cybersecurity regulations and established partnerships with international organizations to share best practices and expertise.

Despite these efforts, Ukraine remains a target for cyber attacks from Russia. In 2017, the country was hit by another cyber attack, the NotPetya ransomware attack, which caused widespread disruption in Ukraine and other countries. The attack is believed to have been carried out by Russian hackers and caused billions of dollars in damage.

Ukraine's experience highlights the growing threat of cyber attacks and the need for countries to take cybersecurity seriously. As technology continues to advance, the risk of cyber attacks is only going to increase. Therefore, countries must continue to invest in cybersecurity measures to protect themselves from these threats.



Threat Actor Review: Anonymous Russia

Who is Anonymous Russia?

The Russian-based members of the group called Anonymous, which made its name known before the war, started to operate as Anonymous Russia, as if to reveal their identities with this crisis between Russia and Ukraine. The opening of the current Telegram group is based on July 10, 2022. With the appearance of Anonymous on the side of Ukraine during the war, these two became two separate groups carrying out their own activities. However, in line with the evidence obtained, Anonymous Russia reveals that although it continues its activities on the side of and in favor of Russia, it still carries the Anonymous mask that is the basis of some of its posts.

Anonymous Russia is known to collaborate with many pro-Russian threat actor groups such as KillNet, DeaDNET, Legion, XakNet, Beregini, CyberArmy, RaHDit, DPR Joker, NoName057 and Zsecnet.



What are the Activities of Anonymous Russia?

Anonymous Russia is known for keeping close to the Russian state. Almost all of its attacks consist of DDoS attacks. These attacks use a dashboad they call STRESSID.CLUB. Therefore, it stands out that there is a certain strategy that is well-established. Even if the technical details are added and changed depending on the return of the situation, the general approach in the attack continues with the same strategies. In any situation that may conflict with the interests of the Russian state, they take action by damaging the assets of the other side of the war.

Which Side They Supports?

When we look at the posts in the Telegram group of Anonymous Russia, the comments made and most importantly, the target of the aggressive behavior it exhibits, it is clearly seen that it is on the side of the Russian State. Although it has carried out cyber attacks on many places within the borders of Russia, it is seen that they have never left the Russian State alone, which is faced with different parties.

What Types of Attacks Does Anonymous Russia Execute?

Except in cases where they do not attack by joining forces, Anonymous Russia often carries out its activities with a single method. This consists of denial-of-service attacks, that is, DDoS attacks. These aggressive activities are mostly carried out on a platform called "STRESSID.CLUB". Apart from this situation, it also exchanges information and data with other threat actor groups with which it operates.

Which Industries Is Anonymous Russia Targeting?

The sectors that Anonymous Russia targets are shaped by topics such as security, health, transportation and communication, which are of critical importance in case of war.




Anonymous Russia's Attacks

Here are some examples of cyber attacks involving Anonymous Russia directly or indirectly:

10 July 2022


Chocolate brand Roshen became the group's first target soon after Anonymous Russia launched its own Telegram group.






They declared that they were waging a cyber war on the public services of the city of Gomel, citing a water shortage.

"As a sign of protest, we declare war on the public services of the city of Gomel due to the sudden cutoff of water in midsummer."






Among those attacked by Anonymous Russia is Europol, the European Union police agency headquartered in The Hague.






In his Telegram post, which he interpreted as "Anonymous RF helps ISPs attack DeadNet "", there are 3 different IP addresses that he attacked.






Ukrainian banks were attacked by Anonymous Russia. Banks affected by these attacks: Credit Dnipro, AvisoBank, A-Bank, Avgard Bank.



Anonymous Russia has blocked the services of the online taxi calling service operating in Ukraine.






7 August 2022

Anonymous Russia attacked a bank named Azerturk Bank, based in Azerbaijan.



14 August 2022


An internet service provider was attacked in Ukraine.





15 August 2022

Anonymous Russia announced on the Telegram group that it participated in the KillNet attack on RuTor.



16 September 2022

Anonymous Russia, in its Telegram sharing, has disabled the platform where an aid campaign gathered for Ukraine was processed.






18 November 2022

The Russian hacktivist group Killnet claimed responsibility for the DDOS attack against satellite service provider Starlink as it supported Ukraine following the Russian invasion. Anonymous Russia is among the collaborating groups mentioned in this attack.

12 February 2023

AnonymousRussia, Killnet, Killmilk and other Russian Hacking and HackTivist Groups have carried out DDOS attacks against NATO's Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) website.






20 February 2023

Anonymous Russia, targeted Polish airports.

Due to DDOS attacks on many international airports in Poland, flights were canceled for a certain period of time.





AnonymousRussia and UserSec supported each other and organized a massive DDoS attack against UK structures.



| Checked on Wed Mar 22 06:50:40 UTC 2023 Check again | | | | |
|---|--------------|----------|---------------------------|--------------|
| Location • | Result | Time | Code | IP address |
| Austria, Vienna | Server error | 12.856 s | 503 (Service Unavailable) | E10040846 |
| Brazil, Sao Paulo | Server error | 11.121 s | 503 (Service Unavailable) | 81,804,01,88 |
| Bulgaria, Sofia | Server error | 9.259 s | 503 (Service Unavailable) | ******* |
| Czechia, C.Budejovice | Server error | 5.713 s | 503 (Service Unavailable) | DUBBLE |
| ₹ Finland, Helsinki | Server error | 18.642 s | 503 (Service Unavailable) | 11.000.00.00 |
| France, Paris | Server error | 5.544 s | 503 (Service Unavailable) | E10040840 |
| France, Roubaix | Server error | 18.136 s | 503 (Service Unavailable) | 81.104.01.18 |
| Germany, Frankfurt | Server error | 11.599 s | 503 (Service Unavailable) | ******* |
| Germany, Nuremberg | Server error | 11.682 s | 503 (Service Unavailable) | E1.004.04.00 |



After the AnonymousRussia and AnonymousSudan team announced "We will attack in 15 minutes" on 22 March 2023 at 11:46, many airports and hospitals in France were targeted.





I Мы все будем атаковать через 15 минут | We'll all attack After 15 Min from now

Airports:

https://www.parisaeroport.fr/ https://www.annecy-airport.com/ https://www.parisvatry.com/ https://www.euroairport.com/ https://www.pau.aeroport.fr/ http://www.brest.aeroport.bzh/

Hospitals:

https://www.american-hospital.org/

https://www.aphp.fr/

https://pitiesalpetriere.aphp.fr/ https://hopital-necker.aphp.fr/

https://hopital-georgespompidou.aphp.fr/


https://hopital-bichat.aphp.fr/



March 28, 2023 The Slovak Republic was targeted by AnonymousRussia for supporting the Banderite government in Ukraine and delivering the MIG-29. It made its servers inaccessible with DDoS attacks.


Victims:


National Bank of Slovakia People's Parliament Slovak Ministry of Justice EximBanka JtBanka





March 28, 2023 AnonymousRussia crashed the official website of the President of Bulgaria with DDoS attacks. AnonymousRussia stated that the attack was a message to the President of Bulgaria.







Anonymous Russia's Attack TTPs

By observing the attacks and behaviors of Anonymous Russia since its emergence, some inferences can be made about whether they are applied repetitively or in a consistent manner.

It targets websites of governments or public institutions. In this way, it gives a clear message to victims that the victims are on the wrong side.

It prefers DDoS attacks against its targets. Victims can recover their systems from attacks, which usually take 1 to 3 days, with appropriate measures in a matter of hours.

They use DDoS attacks against the OSI model. Layer 4 (SYN flood attacks) and layer 7 (high volume POST/GET requests) cause resource exhaustion and system failure.

They announce their attacks, the groups they work with, and the targeted country, organization, domain information via Telegram channels.

It is also associated with other hacker groups that have common goals with them or act in Russian interests. They collaborate with KillNet, DeaDNET, and Legion.

Although he took a stance of defending Russia, from time to time he also targeted organizations within Russia that had nothing to do with the state. (Shoe stores, video sharing platforms, etc.)

Thinking that it would give an advantage to Russia or by displaying a retaliatory attitude, it chose its targets among NATO-linked countries in the steps they took.

It can also be described as a potential threat to countries whose political interests do not match with Russia's.



| Tactics | Technique | Technique ID |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------|
| Reconnaissance | Active Scanning | T1595 |
| Reconnaissance | Gather Victim Host Information | T1592 |
| Reconnaissance | Gather Victim Identity Information | T1589 |
| Reconnaissance | Gather Victim Network Information | T1590 |
| Reconnaissance | Gather Victim Network Information | T1591 |
| Reconnaissance | Search Open Technical Databases | T1596 |
| Reconnaissance | Search Open Websites/Domains | T1593 |
| Reconnaissance | Search Victim-Owned Websites | T1594 |
| Resource Development | Acquire Infrastructure | T1583 |
| Resource Development | Compromise Infrastructure | T1584 |
| Resource Development | Compromise Accounts | T1586 |
| Credential Access | Brute Force | T1110 |
| Inhibit Response Function | Denial of Service | T0814 |
| Impact | Network Denial of Service | T1498 |
| Impact | Service Stop | T489 |



Anonymous Russia's Attack IOCs

Communication Channels

| Telegram | Status | Category |
|----------------------|--------|--------------------------|
| https://t.me/anon_by | ONLINE | Anonymous Russia channel |

Forums


| Web Address | Status | Category |
|-----------------------|--------|----------------------------------|
| https://infinity.ink/ | ONLINE | Forum including Anonymous Russia |

Mirrors

https://creep.im/tor - by Soviet Anonymous (Russia)

DDoS Control Panels

| loC | IoC Type |
|-----------------------|----------|
| http://stressid.club/ | Domain |





| Indicator | Description |
|--|-------------|
| https://40.68.220.40:9443/authenticationendpoint/balgo.jsp | IP |
| https://182.73.18.131:443/authenticationendpoint/balgo.jsp | IP |
| https://63.33.121.175:443/authenticationendpoint/balgo.jsp | IP |
| https://54.228.15.59:443/authenticationendpoint/balgo.jsp | IP |
| https://18.169.37.128:443/authenticationendpoint/balgo.jsp | IP |
| https://sklepyabc.pl | Domain |
| https://marketdino.pl | Domain |
| https://www.eurosklep.eu | Domain |
| https://sklepygama.pl | Domain |
| https://www.groszek.com.pl | Domain |
| https://lewiatan.pl | Domain |
| https://www.piotripawel.pl | Domain |
| https://www.polomarket.pl | Domain |
| https://wss.spolem.org.pl | Domain |
| https://www.topmarkety.pl | Domain |
| https://topaz24.pl | Domain |
| https://www.paih.gov.pl/en | Domain |
| https://pan.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.pot.gov.pl/pl | Domain |
| https://www.pism.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.pkn.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.pcbc.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://rf.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| http://www.brpd.gov.pl/ | Domain |



| http://www.sop.gov.pl/ | Domain |
|-----------------------------------|--------|
| https://www.kombatanci.gov.pl/pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.udt.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.uodo.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.uprp.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.policja.pl/ | Domain |
| http://www.gios.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.lasy.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.archiwa.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.cba.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.wetgiw.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| http://www.gum.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| http://www.ncbj.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.kowr.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.nfz.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.pip.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.polska.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.msz.gov.pl | Domain |
| https://www.mg.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.granica.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.sejm.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.senat.gov.pl/ | Domain |
| https://amw.com.pl/pl | Domain |
| https://altbank.ua | Domain |
| https://plb.pl/en/ | Domain |
| https://modlinairport.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.airport.gdansk.pl/ | Domain |
| https://www.rzeszowairport.pl/en | Domain |



| https://airport.lubuskie.pl/ | Domain |
|---|--------|
| https://www.airport.lublin.pl/ru | Domain |
| https://www.krakowairport.pl/en | Domain |
| https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ | Domain |
| https://www.bnd.bund.de/ | Domain |
| https://www.flughafen-erfurt-weimar.de/ | Domain |
| https://www.hannover-airport.de/ | Domain |
| https://www.dortmund-airport.de/ | Domain |
| https://www.airport-nuernberg.de/ | Domain |
| https://www.baden-airpark.de/en/ | Domain |
| https://www.dus.com/ | Domain |
| https://ac.nato.int/ | Domain |
| https://www.gu.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.kth.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.chalmers.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.su.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.uu.se/ | Domain |
| https://login.nspa.nato.int/my.policy | Domain |
| https://www.nato-pa.int/ | Domain |
| https://nspa.nato.int/ | Domain |
| https://jwc.nato.int/ | Domain |
| https://media.act.nato.int/site/login/ | Domain |
| https://arrc.nato.int/ | Domain |
| https://apx.ndc.nato.int/ | Domain |
| https://www.act.nato.int/ | Domain |
| https://www.jwc.nato.int/ | Domain |
| https://www.jallc.nato.int/ | Domain |
| | |



| https://www.avanza.se/ | Domain |
|--|--------|
| https://www.carnegie.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.swedbank.com/ | Domain |
| https://www.jak.se/ | Domain |
| https://onboarding.abgsc.no/Login | Domain |
| https://pb.carnegie.se/login | Domain |
| https://www.banknorwegian.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.icabanken.se/ | Domain |
| https://seb.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.handelsbanken.com/en | Domain |
| https://www.alandsbanken.ax/ | Domain |
| https://app.bankid.com/sv/ | Domain |
| https://identity.banknorwegian.no/MyPage/Login | Domain |
| https://online.swedbank.se/app/ib/logga-in | Domain |
| https://edge.carnegie.se | Domain |
| https://www.nusjukvarden.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.sahlgrenska.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.sodersjukhuset.se/ | Domain |
| https://sjukhus.sophiahemmet.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.akademiska.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.vgregion.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.erstadiakoni.se/ | Domain |
| https://regionkalmar.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.1177.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.lio.se/ | Domain |
| https://regionsormland.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.skane.se/ | Domain |
| https://cancercentrum.se/ | Domain |
| | |



In-Depth Analysis on The Roles of Threat Actors and Attacks In The Ukraine-Russia War

| https://capiostgoran.se/ | Domain |
|---------------------------------|--------|
| https://www.karolinska.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.regionorebrolan.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.ds.se/ | Domain |
| https://www.radware.com/ | Domain |



