PHP fixed the two PHP2Shell vulnerabilities on 21 October 2026, yet alleged exploit code kept circulating on underground forums and Telegram through 23 October. The patch has not ended attacker interest, so defenders need to confirm the fix is actually running and hunt for signs of exploitation.
PHP2Shell is the name given to two critical memory-safety flaws in PHP core that can lead to remote code execution on web servers. The PHP project reported a demonstrated Apache mod_php exploit that can trigger before any application code runs, so every PHP deployment serving web requests is in scope.
CVE | Issue | CVSS v4.0 |
|---|---|---|
CVE-2026-109618 | Invalid state processed after an out-of-memory interruption | 9.2 |
CVE-2026-109619 | Stale global state retained across requests | 9.2 |
On 23 October, PHP published a notice on CVE-2026-115560, an unusual, configuration-dependent RCE vector. Until the next regular bugfix release, PHP recommends disabling session.upload_progress.enabled where applicable. This is distinct from the two original CVEs and should be reviewed alongside the upgrade.
Within hours of disclosure, PHP2Shell became a topic of exploit requests, PoC sharing and tool demonstrations across four languages. ThreatMon grouped 14 screenshots into 13 observations and did not download or execute any shared tool.
Sharing after the patch
Three observations stand out because they appeared after the 21 October fixes:
Date | Activity | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
23 Oct 2026 | A php2shell.py post offers a download and lists several alleged exploitation chains | Post-patch distribution; the file and chains are unverified |
22 Oct 2026 | A Turkish-language “Full Exploit Source” post shares an archive while quoting the fixed PHP versions | Patch awareness and exploit sharing in the same post |
22 Oct 2026 | A reply claims another PoC worked, with an RCE label and www-data command output | Claimed local demo on a loopback address; no public victim |
The mix of download offers, claimed successes and complaints about failed PoCs shows active interest, while the reliability of the circulating tools remains uncertain. Separately, watchTowr’s honeypots recorded exploitation on 21 October, which confirms attack activity without tying it to these forum accounts.
The indicator set holds 20 IPv4 addresses, 4 domains and 3 URLs linked to scanning, exploit attempts, payload delivery and Potassium infrastructure. All indicators are defanged. Confidence reflects the reported association, not proof of compromise, and IP blocks should be reviewed often because hosting addresses rotate.
Indicator | Observed (UTC) | Confidence | Action |
|---|---|---|---|
87[.]121[.]84[.]174 | 22–23 Oct 2026 | Medium | Block |
181[.]215[.]186[.]252 | 22–23 Oct 2026 | Medium | Block |
185[.]196[.]220[.]132 | 22–23 Oct 2026 | Medium | Block |
185[.]161[.]210[.]29 | 22–23 Oct 2026 | Medium | Block |
45[.]134[.]225[.]16 | 22–23 Oct 2026 | Medium | Block |
193[.]47[.]62[.]24 | 22–23 Oct 2026 | Medium | Block |
117[.]55[.]202[.]115 | 22 Oct 2026 | High | Block |
77[.]237[.]246[.]73 | 22 Oct 2026, 04:28–05:32 | Medium | Block |
45[.]136[.]71[.]89 | 22 Oct 2026, 05:03 | Medium | Block |
92[.]118[.]112[.]100 | 21–22 Oct 2026 | High | Block |
134[.]199[.]154[.]64 | 21–22 Oct 2026 | High | Block |
176[.]65[.]132[.]128 | 21 Oct 2026, 21:55–23:24 | High | Block |
206[.]188[.]197[.]105 | 21 Oct 2026, 19:11–21:05 | High | Block |
45[.]198[.]224[.]169 | 21 Oct 2026, 14:15–15:52 | High | Block |
85[.]11[.]167[.]243 | 21 Oct 2026, 08:37–10:46 | High | Block |
15[.]235[.]206[.]16 | 21 Oct 2026 | Medium | Block |
158[.]69[.]113[.]75 | Not stated | Medium | Block |
94[.]154[.]43[.]149 | Not stated | Medium | Block |
143[.]246[.]223[.]124 | Not stated | Medium | Block |
5[.]191[.]140[.]240 | Not stated | Medium | Monitor only (mobile carrier / proxy) |
Indicator | Type | Observed (UTC) | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
thunder[.]godofthunder[.]st | Domain | 21–22 Oct 2026 | High |
godofthunder[.]st | Domain | 22 Oct 2026 | High |
hackattackkaboom[.]botlesscucks[.]st | Domain | 22 Oct 2026 | High |
hik[.]gettingheadfromduckysmom[.]st | Domain | 22 Oct 2026 | Medium |
hxxp://92[.]118[.]112[.]100/nfs | URL | 21–22 Oct 2026 | High |
hxxp://92[.]118[.]112[.]100/s | URL | 22 Oct 2026 | High |
hxxp://92[.]118[.]112[.]100/nfs-setup | URL | 22 Oct 2026 | High |
VulnCheck reports PHP2Shell scanning from 85[.]11[.]167[.]243 and 45[.]198[.]224[.]169. Arctic Wolf links two of the domains to Potassium samples and saw attempted retrieval of /nfs-setup from 92[.]118[.]112[.]100, without confirming the payload ran. Prioritize outbound connections to payload or C2 hosts: an inbound scanner hit alone does not mean RCE.
The most reliable signal of PHP2Shell exploitation is a PHP or web server process doing something it normally never does: spawning a shell, writing PHP files, or crashing repeatedly. The full report includes 28 queries; below are five representative hunts, one per platform. All use the same web/PHP process list (php-fpm, php-cgi, php, lsphp, apache2, httpd, nginx, w3wp.exe) and a 7-day lookback.
Hunt | What it looks for | Platforms in the full report |
|---|---|---|
Web server spawning shell | Shells or interpreters launched by PHP/web parents | Carbon Black, Splunk, Elastic, QRadar, Sentinel |
Post-exploitation recon | whoami, id, uname, curl/wget, inline php -r or python -c | Carbon Black, Splunk, QRadar, Sentinel |
Web shell in web directory | PHP files created or modified by web processes | Carbon Black, Splunk, QRadar, Sentinel |
PHP worker crash | Segfaults and core dumps in PHP/web processes | Carbon Black, Splunk, QRadar, Sentinel |
Upload-progress / OOM anomalies | PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS requests and memory-exhaustion errors | Splunk, Elastic, QRadar, Sentinel |
Temp-dir execution, outbound C2, log cleanup | Payloads in /tmp or /dev/shm, unusual outbound ports, log deletion | Carbon Black |
session.upload_progress.enabled where it applies.The PHP2Shell fixes have been available since 21 October, but underground forums and Telegram show that interest in the vulnerabilities has not faded. PoCs are being reposted, download offers keep appearing, and at least one user claims a working local RCE. ThreatMon found no independently verified customer compromise, yet external honeypot data confirms exploitation attempts are real. Treat patch deployment as the first step, then verify the running runtime and hunt for the behaviors above.
ThreatMon continues to monitor PHP2Shell discussion and infrastructure. For the full report with all queries and visual evidence, contact info@threatmonit.io.